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The German Political-Economic Trilemma
There is no dearth of literature on Europe’s Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU), a project invested with tremendous political and economic
capital. The attention is deserved. Monetary union involves an unprece-
dented cession of national sovereignty. The creation of money is one of
the most significant powers in the possession of national governing autho-
rities. Even before EMU could be blamed for record levels of unemploy-
ment, it raised the ire of academic economists and invited political con-
troversy. Particularly in Germany, public opinion has consistently oppo-
sed giving up the mark and expert opinion has been seriously divided.
1
Opponents view EMU as an economically flawed policy that will consign
parts of Europe to intractable underdevelopment and give traditionally
more profligate foreign countries a finger on the trigger of German infla-
tion. Notwithstanding the allure of political opportunism, since 1969 suc-
cessive German governments of both major political parties vigorously
1 In May 1998, Associated Press reported opinion polls showing 55 percent of the
German public skeptical of EMU. Roughly one-third favored the policy with sup-
port measurably greater in the new Länder. “Deutsche laut Umfragen me-
hrheitlich gegen Euro,” Associated Press 1 May 1998. More seriously, on Janu-
ary 2, 1998, four renowned economists appealed to the German Constitutional
Court to rule for a delay of EMU. In early February 1998, another 150 German
speaking economists began publicly circulating an open letter expressing their
concerns that EMU would begin prematurely. Beat Gygi, “Widerstand gegen
überstürzte Währungsunion; Wirtschaftswissenschafter rufen im Chor nach Ver-
schiebung,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung 10 February 1998: 17.Eric Richard Staal
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pursued steps toward EMU. Even during Bundestag deliberations for rati-
fication, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) encountered
remarkably few objections.
2
There are doubtless many reasons for which German decision-makers
have endorsed EMU. Standard explanations suggest that the Kohl go-
vernment’s adherence to the detailed Maastricht agenda belied German
national economic interest in currency stability. It is further argued that
Bonn displayed reluctance during and after negotiations, but acquiesced
for purposes of making German unification diplomatically more palatable
to its West European partners.
3 In short, German acceptance of EMU is
attributed to an ‘unification imperative.’ The analysis herein challenges
such claims. For Germany, European monetary union is no mere diplo-
matic expedient that comes at the cost of the national economic interest.
For two decades before unification German decision-makers championed
monetary union, both to bolster European integration and to escape a ‘po-
litical-economic trilemma’ deriving from the reserve currency function of
the German mark. Since the late 1960s German monetary authorities have
faced three undesirable options: uncompetitive exports, domestic inflati-
on, or regional monetary hegemony. German export competitiveness de-
pended on European exchange rate stability, the satisfaction of which me-
ant that Germany either import inflation from its continental trading part-
ners or export higher interest rates abroad. Institutionally and politically
2 “Europadebatte im Parlament. Breite Zustimmung für die Verträge von Maas-
tricht. Über die geplante Währungsunion soll später neu entschieden werden,”
Süddeutsche Zeitung 9 October 1992: 1.
3 Such a line of reasoning is identified throughout the literature on EMU and Ger-
man unification. See Ulrike Guerot, “Deutschland, Frankreich und die Währung-
sunion – über Diskussionen und Metadiskussionen” Frankreich Jahrbuch 1997:
Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Geschichte, Kultur (Opladen: Leske + Budich,
1997) 227. On the assertion that EMU had little economic benefit for Germany
and resulted from unification, see Barry Eichengreen and Jeffry Frieden, “The
Political Economy of EMU: An Analytical Introduction,” The Political Economy
of EMU eds. Eichengreen and Frieden (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1994) especially 18.European Monetary Union: The German Political-Economic Trilemma
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averse to inflation, Germany became a hegemon not by design but de-
fault. Such hegemony, however, undermined the continued exchange rate
cooperation of Germany’s partners and the Kohl government’s foreign
policy commitment to European integration. EMU resolves this unique
German predicament by supplanting the mark with a common European
currency. Nonetheless, in the eyes of Germany’s policy makers and elec-
torate, the project’s success requires solid guarantees of price stability.
Based on this analysis, the German position on EMU was not opposition
but genuine determination to minimize the serious risks involved. Ger-
many was not coerced into giving up the mark for national unity. Rather,
quite apart from the positive diplomatic implications for unification, the
logic of EMU for Germany rests on a solid foreign and economic policy
foundation. After dispensing with the standard argument about Germany’s
motives for EMU, the ‘unification imperative,’ I shall elucidate the ‘poli-
tical-economic trilemma.’
The Unification Imperative
The unification imperative holds that Germany ultimately agreed to the
provisions for EMU in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty “to reaffirm the coun-
try’s commitment to European integration in the wake of reunification.”
4
Pervasive in the literature that echoes this claim is the assumption that
EMU offered Germany few economic benefits beyond the overplayed
advantages of eliminating cross-border transaction costs and exchange-
rate instability.
5 Along with the fact that the Federal Republic conceded
an enviable hegemony in the European Monetary System (EMS),
6 its
4  Loukas Tsoukalis, The New European Economy: the Politics and Economics of
Integration, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993) 208.
5  The European Commission’s studies in the mid-1980s acknowledged that transac-
tion costs and exchange rate instability did not warrant EMU, a point cited
throughout the literature. Eichengreen and Frieden 6.
6  Elke Thiel refutes the notion of a unification imperative for EMU in many of her
writings. It is not inconsistent that she also acknowledges the reality of GermanEric Richard Staal
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stalwart insistence on stringent preconditions adds to impressions of Ger-
man reluctance about EMU. The conclusion frequently drawn is that uni-
fication “tipped the balance” for Germany to agree.
7 An even stronger
formulation comes from the German weekly, Der Spiegel: “The Chan-
cellor of unity gave up the mark in favor of the euro—much earlier and
under other conditions than he had ever planned and not even for unifica-
tion, but only for the vague hope of a German-German confederation.”
8
A cursory view of events surrounding the EC Strasbourg Summit of De-
cember 8-9, 1989 indicates that German Chancellor Kohl was coerced
into EMU. After expressing serious reservations about French demands
for a firm date to convene the intergovernmental conference (IGC) on
EMU in 1990, Kohl gave his assent at Strasbourg and conspicuously ob-
tained the EC’s endorsement of Germany’s right to self-determination.
Two days prior to the summit Mitterrand met with Soviet Premier Gorba-
chev in Kiev in an apparent diplomatic maneuver to forestall unification.
9
Kohl’s advisor Horst Teltschik attests that “the guessing game over the
intentions of the French President” had begun and, more to the point,
admitted to a journalist on December 1 that “the German government
finds itself in the position of having to agree to practically every French
initiative for Europe.”
10 Der Spiegel induces: “The prospects for German
unity supplied the Frenchman [Mitterrand] the long awaited means of
hegemony in the 1980s. See, “Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion: Von
der Marktintegration zur politischen Integration,” APuZ B7-8/92 (1992): 3-11.
For a discussion of the implications of German hegemony, please see below,
‘Germany’s Political-Economic Trilemma.’
7  Tsoukalis, 208.
8  “Dunkelste Stunden,” Der Spiegel 18 (1998): 108. All translations in this paper
are the author’s.
9  Stephen Szabo’s detailed account of the entire unification process illustrates such
acrobatics. The Diplomacy of German Unification (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1992) 50.
10  Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler Verlag,
1991) Quotes on 47 and 61, respectively.European Monetary Union: The German Political-Economic Trilemma
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pressure to extort from the German [Kohl] the necessary yes for monetary
union and shake off the predominance of the German Bundesbank.”
11
Germany’s position on EMU after Strasbourg is also interpreted through
the lens of a unification imperative. Geoffrey Garrett offers one of the
more crude versions, arguing that the need to allay American and Euro-
pean fears of a “bellicose remilitarization” led Germany to compromise
on guarantees of price stability during the Maastricht negotiations.
12 Typi-
cal extrapolations of such an account describe the German position on
EMU in the 1990s as driven by a need to compensate for conceding too
much at Maastricht. Also critical of Germany’s difficult negotiating posi-
tion, Edmund Dell implies that Bonn intentionally delayed EMU in the
1990s:
“it is the German Government and the Bundestag that are forcing de-
ferment by insisting on economic convergence, the virtual abandon-
ment of fiscal as well as monetary sovereignty, and a form of politi-
cal union, including a strengthening of the European Parliament, not
desired even by some of their partners committed to monetary uni-
on.”13
Beyond accusations that Kohl purposefully delayed EMU, the misguided
logic of the unification imperative is applied to his motives for linking
European Political Union (EPU) to EMU. In this regard John Woolley
speculates that the Chancellor conditioned his support for EMU on unrea-
listic demands for EPU as part of an underhanded attempt to overload and
sabotage the Maastricht agenda entirely.
14 Arguments that the German
11  “Dunkelste Stunden” 109.
12  “The Politics of Maastricht,” eds. Eichengreen and Frieden 58. Such analysis is
especially problematic, for the Bush Administration is universally recognized in
the literature as favorably disposed toward unification and the Maastricht Treaty
usually criticized for overemphasis of price stability. See, Loukas Tsoukalis, The
New European Economy Revisited (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997) 171. Hereafter,
Revisited.
13  “The Report of the Three Wise Men,” Contemporary European History 2.1
(1993): 44.
14  John Woolley, “Linking Political and Monetary Union: The Maastricht AgendaEric Richard Staal
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motive for EMU results from a unification imperative have many weak-
nesses.
The superficial coincidence of events notwithstanding, decisive steps to-
ward EMU had been taken much before German unification catapulted
onto the European agenda. In the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, the
EC agreed to hold an IGC on institutional reforms of the European Mo-
netary System (EMS) at an unspecified time. Although no one in 1986
anticipated the conference for 1990, German Foreign Minister Hans-
Dietrich Genscher began calling for a European Central Bank (ECB) du-
ring 1987 and in February 1988 issued a memorandum advocating EMU.
Four months later the European Council in Hanover agreed to EMU and
commissioned EC President Jacques Delors to prepare a report on the ne-
cessary steps. Meeting in Madrid the following year the European Coun-
cil adopted the Delors plan for EMU and agreed to begin the first stage of
the irreversible process on July 1, 1990. Madrid also commissioned pre-
parations for the IGC, which was envisioned to commence soon after sta-
ge one. In the summer of 1989 the Guigou committee of personal advisors
to the Foreign and Finance Ministers assembled to report to the European
Council at Strasbourg on the essential questions for an IGC. Franco-
German consultations in early October led to plans for a decision at Stras-
bourg on beginning the IGC in the latter half of 1990.
15
Unification, meanwhile, was not a near term eventuality until roughly half
a year later at the end of January 1990.
16 Although the East German regi-
me displayed signs of instability in early 1989, the Berlin Wall remained
closed until November 9, 1989. Unification quickly became inevitable,
and German Domestic Politics,” eds. Eichengreen and Frieden 67-86.
15  Wilhelm Schönfelder and Elke Thiel, Ein Markt - Eine Währung: Die Verhand-
lungen zur Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (Baden-Baden: Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1994) 17-21.
16  Hanns Jürgen Küsters, “Entscheidung für die deutsche Einheit: Einführung in die
Edition,” Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, Deutsche Einheit: Sonderedition aus
den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 1989/90, eds. Küsters and Daniel Hofman
(München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998) 233.European Monetary Union: The German Political-Economic Trilemma
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but apart from Genscher no one imagined it to be imminent until months
later.
17 In his Ten Point Plan of November 28, Chancellor Kohl cautiously
envisioned a decade long process of confederation of the two German
states within the context of a politically united Europe capable of absor-
bing German power.
18 The Chancellory’s documentation reveals the per-
ception that French President François Mitterrand supported unification in
principle as early as July 1989
19 but that he did not conceptionalize it as a
near term outcome until early 1990. He is depicted as “irresolute” in re-
action to the sudden potential to overcome the division of Germany.
20 Si-
milarly, his Foreign Minister Roland Dumas did not anticipate a quick
unification.
21
German consent to EMU and to the IGC in 1990 at Strasbourg predated
most governmental prognostications of pending German unification. The
primary determinants of the German decision for EMU therefore must be
found in considerations relevant before unification and elaborated later in
this paper. Still, as shown below, EMU undeniably had clear positive di-
plomatic externalities for German unification and the accelerating reality
of German unification in early 1990 gave additional impetus to both Fran-
ce and Germany to overcome their outstanding differences over imple-
menting the final two stages of the Delors plan. The following analysis of
the French position and German reaction, as well as of the Strasbourg
decision should help to disentangle cause and effect with regard to the
question of a German ‘unification imperative’ for EMU. Although the
process of EMU had begun, by early 1990 both French and Greman lea-
17  Szabo notes Genscher’s unique prescience in this regard, 37. Condoleeza Rice and
Philip Zelikow point to strong domestic East German support for the survival of
their state. Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1995) 112.
18  Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Delors, Bonn, 5 October 1989,
Dokumente 445f.
19  Vorlage des Vortragenden Legationsrats I Bitterlich an Bundeskanzler Kohl,
Bonn, 14 July 1989, Dokumente 346.
20  Küsters 232.Eric Richard Staal
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ders explicitly recognized that full monetary integration carried the benefit
of constituting part of an international context favorable to German unifi-
cation.
The Diplomatic Externality of EMU
To begin with, there was no necessity to coerce German cooperation in
EMU or deeper political integration. German leaders gladly embraced the
opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to Europe. Throughout the
history of the Federal Republic the two objectives of European integration
and German unification had been two sides of the same foreign policy.
22
For Kohl political and monetary union were the logical and desirable ex-
tension of earlier policies. It was no departure from the past to argue that
“in the nineties the French and the entire European Community would
have great advantages from the strengthened economic power of Ger-
many.”
23 That Kohl and Genscher vigorously supported this process
should in no way indicate a preparation to abdicate Germany’s right to
self-determination.
24 Responding to the reservations of other EC leaders in
Paris on November 18, 1989, the Chancellor stated, “no-one, neither in
the East nor in the West, would be able to ignore a vote of all Germans
for the unity of their fatherland.”
25 Germany had a self-imposed precondi-
tion for its own unity that it occur in a favorable international context. In
the same way, French concerns about German unification during 1989-
1990 amounted neither to deviation from its foreign policy tradition nor to
21  Teltschik 26.
22  For one of the most comprehensive treatments, see Wolfram F. Hanrieder,
Deutschland, Amerika, Europa: Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land 1949-1994 (Paderborn: Schöningh Verlag, 1995).
23  Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Staatspräsident Mitterrand, Paris, 15 Feb-
ruary 1990, Dokumente 849.
24  Teltschik 38.
25 Helmut Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit, dargestellt von Kai Diekman und
Ralf Georg Reuth (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 1996) Quote on 151; see also 230.European Monetary Union: The German Political-Economic Trilemma
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opposition to German unification. Paris expressed three broad areas of
reservation about German unity.
First, the monumental changes in East-West relations raised questions
about the Federal Republic’s foreign policy of integration in West Europe
and membership in NATO. Perennial French anxieties about a modern
day Rapallo accord between Germany and Russia had surfaced at critical
times throughout the Cold War. Most recently, Dumas began to question
Germany’s continued Western moorings as early as 1986, after Mikhail
Gorbachev had announced a program of domestic political and economic
reforms.
26 Pond mentions that Bonn’s contemporaneous position on arms
control negotiations had added to “French fears about German reliability .
. . and Gorbachev’s seductive attractiveness.”
27 France could not afford a
neutralization of German security policy that for all practical purposes
would extend Soviet military hegemony to its own border.
28 Further,
France wanted to prevent an intensification of German relations with
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union from coming at the expense of the
Franco-German political and economic axis, especially with regard to EC
integration.
29 When the wall unexpectedly fell, Paris viewed Germany’s
future foreign policy orientation as conceptionally in flux and its own se-
curity at stake. Still, rather than endorse the Soviet proposal to weaken a
united Germany by requiring each part to maintain its Cold War alliance
26  Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Errinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1995), 381, 387.
27  Elizabeth Pond, Beyond the Wall: Germany’s Road to Unification (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993) 67.
28  Anne-Marie LeGloannec emphasizes a French Rapallo complex. “France, Ger-
many, and the New Europe,” eds. Dirk Verheyen and Christian Søe The Germans
and Their Neighbors (￿oulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993): 13-34. On Mit-
terrand’s views see, Roland Dumas, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Hubert Védrine,
“Frankreichs Deutschlandpolitik 1989/90 im Rückblick” eds. Brigitte Sauzay and
Rudolf von Thadden Mitterrand und die Deutschen (Wallstein Verlag: Göttingen,
1998): 17-25. Helmut Kohl reports on related deliberations with Mitterrand, 236.
On French concerns about German neutrality also see Rice and Zelikow, 171.
29  Genscher, 375. Szabo, 50.Eric Richard Staal
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membership, France sought uncompromised German participation in
NATO.
A second closely related French reservation had to do with the loss of its
own economic and foreign policy influence. For two decades France had
made pursuit of economic parity with West Germany an objective of its
industrial policy.
30 Through eventual unification West Germany would
expand by seventeen million people
31 and emerge with its full sovereignty
intact. In French eyes, Germany would have greater economic potential
and fewer foreign policy inhibitions. A dominant German trade and in-
vestment presence in Eastern Europe would also marginalize Paris. Fi-
nally, the end of bipolarity would eliminate the need for French mediation
between the Soviet bloc and the West. Kohl’s sensitivity to such anxieties
about German predominance reinforced his pursuit of European monetary
integration.
32
The last of Mitterrand’s major reservations about German unification had
to be carefully reconciled with the first two. Unification had large poten-
tial for jeopardizing support for Gorbachev’s reforms.
33 After meeting
with Gorbachev in Kiev, Mitterrand explained to Kohl in Strasbourg that
he “could still not foresee and comprehend . . . how Gorbachev would
react to a very rash development to unity. In the GDR stood the Soviet
army, the GDR was a core country for the Warsaw Pact.” Both leaders
assessed the Warsaw Pact as a “fiction” but knew that Gorbachev’s do-
30  For the relevance of such French concerns see Szabo, 48. Also, Richard Kiess-
ler/Frank Elbe, Ein Runder Tisch mit Scharfen Ecken: der Diplomatische Weg
zur Deutschen Einheit (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlaggesellschaft, 1993) 62. On
French economic dependence on Germany, see Christian Deubner, Udo Rehfeldt
and Frieder Schlupp, “Deutsch-französische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen im Rahmen
der Weltwirtschaftlichen Arbeitsteilung: Interdepedenz, Divergenz oder Struk-
tureller Dominanz,” Deutschland, Frankreich, Europa: Bilanz einer Schwierigen
Partnerschaft ed. Robert Picht (München: R. Piper Verlag, 1978).
31  Mitterrand expressed this concern to Kohl. “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl
mit Staatspräsident Mitterrand,” Paris, 15 February 1990, Dokumente 849.
32  Rice and Zelikow 145.
33  Rice and Zelikow 116.European Monetary Union: The German Political-Economic Trilemma
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mestic support depended on its existence. Kohl identified with Mitterrand:
“the solution to the German question could not be allowed to provoke a
new Russian tragedy.”
34 United Germany’s full membership in NATO,
however, could make Gorbachev vulnerable to domestic accusations of
having conceded Russia’s sphere of influence to a cohort of its rivals.
Gorbachev had told Mitterrand in Kiev that if Germany reunified “a Sovi-
et marshal will be sitting in my chair.”
35 The mismanagement of unificati-
on could produce destabilizing reactions, confronting Germany with an
unfriendly East in a new geopolitical vacuum.
Mitterrand’s preoccupation with East European stability and attempt to
carve out a special French role in the unification process
36 placed him at
odds with Kohl over Germany’s formal recognition of the Polish border.
The French President was skeptical of Gorbachev’s rhetorical acceptance
of Germany’s right to self-determination and pleaded Poland’s case that
Bonn quickly recognize the Oder-Neisse line on behalf of a united Ger-
many. Kohl, however, wanted to defer such recognition to a legitimately
elected, united German parliament. He told Mitterrand “it would be a
psychologically important point that the confirmation of the borders go
together with reunification and not be a precondition.”
37 Also Kohl wan-
ted to avoid impressions of involuntary German territorial concessions
made at the behest of the Four Powers.
38 Finally, Kohl would like to have
had a Polish gesture disclaiming World War II reparations. Kohl’s ratio-
nale notwithstanding, the impression was unavoidable that he was merely
contriving reasons for delay to pacify a constituency of expellees from
territory Poland had gained after the war.
39
34  Kohl, 234.
35  Rice and Zelikow, 137.
36  Küsters 235.
37  Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Staatspräsident Mitterrand, Paris, 15 Feb-
ruary 1990, Dokumente 847.
38  Küsters 235.
39  Most accounts of Kohl‘s position on the Polish border also attribute his motives to
a desire to pacify a vocal constituency of Geman expellees and gain Polish renun-Eric Richard Staal
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In order to preserve Germany’s active engagement in European integrati-
on, maintain the balance in Franco-German economic and foreign policy
relations, and avoid new instability in the East, Kohl and Mitterrand
agreed to strengthen the EC and, over the longer term, enlarge its mem-
bership.
40 Before and after Strasbourg Kohl slowly convinced Mitterrand
to take up EC institutional reforms along with the agenda for EMU.
41 The
two leaders also agreed on the need for political treaties with Eastern Eu-
rope and the Soviet Union. If Russia became hostile, she would then be
“isolated.”
42 In this sense, it was once again Franco-German collaborati-
on, the very core of previous major European initiatives, that set the prio-
rities of the next decade—‘deepening’ would necessarily precede ‘wi-
dening.’
The sequence of events indicates that Kohl considered EPU as much more
central to unification diplomacy than EMU, to which he had already
agreed. By anchoring a united Germany more firmly in the EC and there-
by diluting its dominance, EMU could address the above French misgi-
vings about unification. Küsters and Hofmann even call “the European
binding of German monetary and economic power a decisive factor” in
Mitterrand’s agreement to unification.
43 For Mitterrand, ‘deepening’ the
EC was even meant to nurture German unity: the further construction of
Europe would bring us closer to the day, on which the division of the
continent would be overcome, on which Germany could be reunified.”
44
For these reasons EMU clearly had a positive diplomatic externality for
ciation of reparations. Szabo 68-75.
40  Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers mit Staatspräsident Mitterrand, Latché, 4 January
1990, Dokumente 689.
41  Teltschik, 70-71. “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Staatspräsident Mitter-
rand,” Paris, 15 February 1990, Dokumente 849.
42  Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Staatspräsident Mitterrand, Latché, 4
January 1990, Dokumente 687.
43  Küsters 231.
44  54. Deutsch-französische Konsultationen, Bonn, 2/3 November 1989, Dokumente
473.European Monetary Union: The German Political-Economic Trilemma
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German unification. A closer look at the Strasbourg summit further illu-
minates this.
Strasbourg and After: EMU and EPU
There existed two main Franco-German differences over the summit at
Strasbourg. One disagreement had to do with when to convene the IGC
for negotiating stages two and three of the Delors plan. The move to
EMU had irreversibly begun in Madrid in June 1989, but much remained
to be determined. Kohl had proposed at Madrid that the IGC begin coin-
cident with the beginning of stage one of EMU on July 1, 1990. This
would permit treaty ratification before the end of 1992, i.e. before the
completion of the Single European Market (SEM) initiative.
45 As the
Strasbourg summit neared, however, Kohl grew fearful that the IGC
would fail for want of an exact mandate.
46 The French government did not
share this fear and thought it more important to set a firm date for the
IGC without necessarily preordaining all matters for discussion.
47 To the
satisfaction of both France and Germany, the outcome at Strasbourg was
to convene the IGC by the end of 1990, allowing sufficient time to draft a
precise mandate.
The second fundamental difference was over the timing for institutional
reforms. For two decades EMU German policy held that EMU was inse-
parable from EPU. As the East German government deteriorated and uni-
fication increasingly became the only option for stability, Kohl insisted
more on EPU in connection with EMU. In October Kohl told Italian Pri-
me Minister Andreotti that the final goal of European integration was not
the completion of the SEM but EPU, “an existential question” for the Fe-
45  Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Staatspräsident Mitterrand, Paris, 22 June
1989, Dokumente 308.
46  Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Ministerpräsident Andreotti, Bonn, 18
October 1989, Dokumente 453f.
47  Vorlage des Vortragenden Legationsrats I Bitterlich an Bundeskanzler Kohl,
Bonn, 2/3 December 1989, Dokumente 596f.Eric Richard Staal
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deral Republic. In this way, Kohl intended to show that the “ghost of Ra-
pallo does not dwell among us.”
48 The insistence on a “debate on the fi-
nality of the Community” led the Chancellor into direct conflict with
French Prime Minister Rocard, who argued that it would be too late to
take up the subject of expanding the rights of the Parliament at the sum-
mit.
49 Also, Mitterrand would only consider EC institutional changes after
concluding a treaty on EMU. The German government viewed this as
consistent with the “French tendency to confer the EP [European Palia-
ment] only more symbolic rights” and suspected that Mitterrand held the
demand for EPU to be a ‘maneuver of diversion’ from monetary union.
50
On November 17, Teltschik briefed Kohl that French decision-makers
worried that the opening of the Berlin Wall imperiled Strasbourg decisi-
ons on the Social Charter and EMU.
51 Ten days later Kohl proposed a ti-
meframe for progress on EMU and EPU. Preparations for the IGC on
EMU would be completed by the Rome summit of December 1990. Me-
anwhile, the Dublin summit of June 1990 would take up a report on in-
stitutional reforms. A two-phase IGC would begin in Rome covering
EMU immediately and institutional reforms by the end of 1991. The IGC
would conclude in December 1992. Ratification would ensue in 1993 in
advance of elections to the European Parliament in 1994.
52
In his correspondence to Mtterrand on December 5, 1989 Kohl revised
his proposal, placing EPU on a parallel track with EMU. Conditional
48  Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Ministerpräsident Andreotti, Bonn, 18
October 1989, Dokumente 453f.
49  54. Deutsch-französische Konsultationen, Bonn, 2 - 3 November 1989, Doku-
mente 473-476.
50  Vorlage des Vortragenden Legationsrats I Bitterlich an Bundeskanzler Kohl,
Bonn, 2 - 3 December 1989, Dokumente 596f.
51  Gesamtgesprächsführungsvorschlag, Vorlage des Ministerialdirektors Teltschik an
Bundeskanzler Kohl, Bonn, 17 November 1989, Dokumente 542.
52  EG-Gipfel in Straßburg am 8. und 9. Dezember 1989, Arbeitskalender für das
weitere Vorgehen bis 1993, Schreiben des Bundeskanzlers Kohl an Staatspräsident
Mitterrand, Bonn, 27 November 1989, Dokumente 566f.European Monetary Union: The German Political-Economic Trilemma
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upon preparations made under the Irish Presidency in the first half of
1990, Rome would also commission the IGC to deal immediately with
expanding the rights of the parliament. The goal would be to submit the
agreements on EMU and EPU to the Dutch Presidency in December 1991
with the finalization of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in early
1992 and ratified that same year. Kohl argued that national parliaments
would only accept the transfer of responsibilities to European institutions
if the European Parliament gained power to the same extent that national
legislatures abdicated it.
53
Despite German agreement at Strasbourg to start the IGC in 1990, the
rapid developments in East Germany during the month of January led po-
licy makers in Bonn to worry that their commitment to European integra-
tion would fall under greater suspicion. Kohl’s advisor Hartmann wrote
that for politico-psychological reasons it would be
“indispensable . . . to demonstrate our engagement for the economic
and political integration of the European Community. We have done
this in Strasbourg, but we must assume that our partners will very
closely pay attention to whether this elan ceases in the now ongoing
difficult preparations of the Intergovernmental Conference for EMU
and other reform plans.”
54
With unification becoming more of an immediate prospect, the German
government anticipated growing doubts about its foreign policy commit-
ment to the EC.
Meeting in Paris on February 15, 1990, Kohl described to Mitterrand his
fleeting ability to control events on the ground, referring to the ninety
thousand eastern Germans that had fled to the West in the new year.
55 The
53  Schreiben des Bundeskanzlers Kohl an Staatspräsident Mitterrand, Bonn, 5 De-
cember 1989, Dokumente 614f.
54  Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Hartmann, Bonn, 29 January 1990, Do-
kumente 729.
55  Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Staatspräsident Mitterrand, Paris, 15 Feb-
ruary 1990, Dokumente 845.Eric Richard Staal
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next day Delors emphasized the importance of intensifying efforts for
EPU at the planned extraordinary summit in Dublin.
56 For Kohl, Dublin
had to offer more than ‘lip service.’ He named strengthening the rights of
the European Parliament, Delors’ suggestion for reform of European Po-
litical Cooperation (EPC) in foreign policy, and questions of community
efficiency.
57 At Dublin, EPU was finally placed on a parallel track with
EMU. The European Council in Rome would receive concrete suggesti-
ons for creating a European Union and convene a separate IGC on EPU.
Ratification was envisioned for the end of 1993. These efforts not-
withstanding, after Germany’s allies and the Soviet Union formally con-
sented to its unification in the Two Plus Four Treaty, Kohl openly wor-
ried that the objective of EPU would yield to the goal of EC widening,
reducing the Community to a free trade area .
58
Summary
Under closer analysis, that Germany agreed to EMU for purposes of uni-
fication is anachronistic, at best. There can be very little doubt as to the
commitment of the Kohl government to European Union, i.e. EMU and
EPU, for its own sake. Both the French reaction to the events leading to
German unity and the response of the Kohl government reflect an extensi-
on of each country’s traditional postwar foreign policy. Neither country
saw EMU as a price for German unity but as part of a favorable context
for such an eventuality. Decisions taken at Strasbourg and after did not
entail whether but how to proceed with EMU and contend with its politi-
cal ramifications. Rather than sacrifice EPU and concede to EMU in or-
der to gain French acceptance of unification, Kohl drove a harder bargain
for EPU.
56  Gespräch des Ministerialdirigenten Hartmann und des Ministerialrats Ludewig mit
Präsident Delors, Paris, 16 February 1990, Dokumente 853.
57  Schreiben des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Delors, Bonn, 13 March 1990,
Dokumente 936.
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To be sure, the decision on the IGC on EMU diplomatically favored
Germany’s long-term unification. Both Germany and France understood
this in the context of broader European Union and more than simply a
quid pro quo. Strasbourg accommodated Kohl’s concerns to allow time to
develop an exact mandate for the IGC and included a statement on the
need for EC institutional reforms. The decision was not narrowly targeted
at a distant unification but at current events throughout Eastern Europe.
Genscher notes, the immediate interest was to ensure that “the dynamic of
integration of the European Community kept in step with the East-West
development.”
59 Kohl’s advisor Bitterlich commented to the same effect
that Mitterrand sought a “’necessary acceleration’ of the integration
process – as answer to the ‘challenge from the east.’”
60 Once unification
became a near-term reality in early 1990, both the German and French
governments resolved to accelerate EPU, indicating that EMU itself was
not a quid pro quo for French acceptance of unification. As at other mo-
mentous times during the Cold War, what alarmed the French govern-
ment in late 1989 was not German unification, but the uncertainty of
German foreign policy under the Soviet and East European dynamic of
the late 1980s.
Even less compelling is the claim that Germany compromised on guaran-
tees of price stability at EMU during or after the Maastricht negotiations,
by which time “Kohl already represented a Germany ‘united’ in the for-
mal sense.”
61 During the IGC on EMU Germany obtained strong assuran-
ces that EMU would not be inflationary, most notably an independent
ECB modeled on the Bundesbank and economic convergence criteria for
stage three. In their detailed study of the negotiations, Wilhelm Schönfel-
Dokumente 1545f.
59  Genscher, 390.
60  Vorlage des Vortragenden Legationsrats I Bitterlich an Bundeskanzler Kohl,
Bonn, 2 - 3 December 1989, Dokumente 598.
61  Roger Morgan, “France and Germany as Partners in the European Community”
Patrick McCarthy ed. France-Germany, 1983-1993: the Struggle to Cooperate
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993) 103.Eric Richard Staal
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der and Elke Thiel unequivocally reject claims that the German position
on EMU softened after unification:
The idea that ‘false’ compromises were entered into for purposes of Ger-
man unity is in no way accurate. The German negotiating process was at
all times exclusively oriented around the actual problem at hand [EMU].
Also, among the negotiating partners it was not recognizable that they al-
lowed their position on EMU to be somehow influenced by the German
question.
62
German unification did not factor directly into the Maastricht negotia-
tions, which is consistent with the occurrence of events.
The ‘unification imperative’ is especially troubling because it insinuates
that EMU has no intrinsic value for German policy makers; i.e. that the
D-Mark is a ransom paid to capricious European partners, who, after
forty years of cooperation, still harbor the prejudice that Germans possess
an alarming proclivity for militarism. This latent polemic could become
active throughout Europe, should EMU not live up to the economic aspi-
rations of the statesmen whose brainchild it was. There is also widespread
sentiment that Germany succumbed to French demands for EMU in trade
for empty French promises for Political Union. The logical extension of
the ‘unification imperative’ is that Germany would likely abort its com-
mitment to monetary integration if the project became politically and eco-
nomically costly. Yet, the adherence to the unpopular EMU agenda
throughout the 1990s more likely reflects genuine support for EMU for its
own sake. The plausibility of a ‘unification imperative’ notwithstanding,
the fortuitous relationship of EMU to unification was more likely a positi-
ve foreign policy externality. The following analysis provides a viable
alternative explication of German motives for EMU, thereby placing the
‘unification imperative’ into more modest perspective.
62  Schönfelder and Thiel 22.European Monetary Union: The German Political-Economic Trilemma
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Germany’s Political-Economic Trilemma
Since the late 1960s, depreciation of the U.S. dollar has destabilized Eu-
ropean currencies, disrupting regional trade and the sensitive Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP). The resulting pressure for appreciation on the
mark relative to other European currencies threatened the price competiti-
veness of German exports. In the inhospitable international economic cli-
mate of the early 1970s and 1980s European exchange rate regimes offe-
red German exporters relief. At the same time, however, the maintenance
of fixed currencies confronted Germany with the risk of either importing
inflation from its European partners or becoming a monetary hegemon.
Averse to inflation, the Bundesbank neglected both to intervene in defense
of the nominal parities and to lower domestic interest rates to ease specu-
lation against weaker currencies pegged to the mark. To avoid depletion
of foreign reserves and maintain the exchange rate, weak currency coun-
tries could not lower interest rates independent of the Bundesbank. The
onus of macroeconomic policy adjustment fell asymmetrically upon wea-
ker currency countries. As much as German leaders renounced all hege-
monic aspirations, the exigencies of exchange rate and price stability led
inexorably to that outcome. By the mid 1980s the sustainability of fixed
exchange rates came into question, resurrecting German fears of EC de-
valuations that would erode its competitive gains in productivity. Hege-
mony was also a foreign policy liability, as Germany faced accusations of
deliberately using its position in the EMS to exploit its EC partners.
Attempts to shift the burden of macroeconomic policy adjustment to Ger-
many had only limited results. Whereas tensions arising from German
monetary hegemony led to a breakdown of fixed exchange rates and a
reappreciation of the mark in the 1970s, a decade later European leaders
pressed on with integration. Capital liberalization and dollar weakness in
the mid-1980s exacerbated the asymmetric operation of the EMS and
reinvigorated the goal of monetary union. German unification reinforced
this ambitious agenda, intensifying preexisting foreign policy and econo-
mic imperatives. EMU for Germany thus resulted primarily from the tri-Eric Richard Staal
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lemma of uncompetitive exports, domestic inflation, and monetary hege-
mony. Germany’s commitment to EMU is incomprehensible outside of
this context.
EMU in the 1970s
Prior to the Hague summit of 1969, monetary integration in Europe was
limited to the modest provisions of the 1957 Rome Treaties, which cited
stable exchange rates as an essential aspect of the future customs union,
single market and common agricultural policy (CAP). The treaties envi-
sioned macroeconomic policy consultations to reinforce domestic policies
aimed at full employment, low inflation, and balance of payments equili-
brium.
63 Preoccupied with implementing the customs union and owing to
exchange rate stability, the EEC had little need to emphasize monetary
integration before the latter 1960s. The monumental achievement of the
period in the way of macroeconomic cooperation was setting up the con-
sultative Committee of Central Bank Governors in 1964. By the time the
customs union was in place in 1968, however, U.S. macroeconomic ex-
pansion had undermined exchange rate stability as an operating assumpti-
on in the course of international trade and payments. The differential rates
of inflation that followed distorted the CAP, common market, and Ger-
man export competitiveness. European differences arising from the trade-
off between exchange rate stability and domestic inflation were present in
the earliest debates over EMU.
Whereas ‘monetarist’ countries (e.g. France, Belgium, and Luxembourg)
advocated fixed parities to arrest the depreciation of their currencies,
Germany, along with the Netherlands, took the ‘economist’ approach of
prioritizing macroeconomic convergence. The French strategy for econo-
mic growth relied on fixed parities to restore confidence in the franc,
counter inflation, and ultimately permit lower interest rates. A fixed ex-
63  Article 105 provides for the establishment of a consultative Monetary Committee of
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. Article 108 calls for balance ofEuropean Monetary Union: The German Political-Economic Trilemma
23
change rate regime would include intervention and credit facilities to shift
the burden of adjustment to surplus countries. This, however, assumed
that surplus countries, e.g. Germany, would risk domestic inflation to
finance French deficits or defend the franc on international markets. The
Bundesbank probably loathed nothing more than the specter of importing
inflation. For Germany, coordinated anti-inflationary policies were the
sine qua non of fixed currencies, the purpose of which would be to alle-
viate the mark appreciation. In the German view, exchange rate stability
could not be superimposed but had to ensue on the basis of macroecono-
mic convergence. In short, France wanted to use the exchange rate for
price stability and growth, while Germany wanted to use coordinated anti-
inflation to achieve foreign exchange stability.
64
The outcome of the monetarist-economist quarrel was an agreement to
simultaneously pursue price and exchange rate stability as prescribed in
the October 1970 Report of Luxembourg President Pierre Werner, which
called for a three-stage transition to EMU by 1980. To this end, various
credit mechanisms were established by 1972. The first stage included fi-
xed parities and macroeconomic policy coordination. The final stage en-
tailed the centralization of monetary policy decisions with regard to inte-
rest rates, exchange rates, internal liquidity, and the management of re-
serves. The Report also called for an agreement governing national fiscal
policies, i.e. debt financing and surplus allocation, and reiterated the im-
portance of implementing the Common Market.
65 A system of central
banks and an organ for common economic policy decision making were to
be added to the proliferating array of European institutions. Very much a
prototype of the modern day EMU agenda, the Report comprehensively
spelled out the political and economic consequences.
payments assistance along with the abolition of exchange controls.
64  For differences in the French and German led positions, see Tsoukalis, 178; also,
Hanrieder 314.
65  The Common Market, also referred to in the 1980s as the Single European Market
(SEM), is defined by the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor.Eric Richard Staal
24
The elimination of independent monetary policies and new constraints on
national fiscal policies would deprive members of the traditional instru-
ments of stimulating the economy. This left available three mechanisms to
stimulate the economy in depressed regions: wage and price flexibility;
mobility of capital and labor; and fiscal expansion. The first of these
would attract investment by reducing the local costs of production.
However, this was politically infeasible thanks to obstructive labor uni-
ons, leftist parties, and corporatist institutions.
66 Meanwhile, the EEC lak-
ked the budgetary resources for fiscal transfers. The mobility of capital
and labor, on the other hand, was already included in the Rome Treaty
provisions for a Single European Market (SEM), according the Commu-
nity a legal basis to act. In fact, EMU and the SEM were mutually depen-
dent. Access to capital and the ability of excess labor to emigrate to regi-
ons with better employment prospects would temper the effects of a
common monetary policy that proved overly restrictive for certain locali-
ties, while stable exchange rates constituted the foundation for the flow of
goods, capital, services, and labor.
The EEC adoption of the Werner Plan and resolution for the SEM in
March 1971 addressed the threat of dollar depreciation to Germany’s Eu-
ropean export competitiveness. However, these measures ran up against
international monetary turbulence and deficient monetary coordination.
Amidst growing pressure for appreciation and despite closing the foreign
exchange market, the mark floated in May 1971. The Smithsonian agree-
ment of December the same year reinstituted an international monetary
system with fixed-rates, albeit with wider margins of fluctuation totaling
4.5 percent. For the EEC, however, currency fluctuations within these
margins were expected to prove damaging to the CAP and SEM. For
Germany, in particular, appreciation of the mark remained a concern.
67 In
an effort to ”insulate their currencies from the potent external pressure
66  John B. Goodman, Monetary Sovereignty: the Politics of Central Banking in
Western Europe (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1992).
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generated by the loss of confidence in the dollar”
68 and to progress toward
the goal of EMU by 1980, EEC members formed among themselves nar-
rower bands of fluctuation set at 2.25 percent of EC-dollar parities.
Agreed in March 1972, the intra-EEC margins constituted the ‘snake’ in-
side the ‘tunnel’ of the wider Smithsonian limits. Consistent with the
‘economist’ and ‘monetarist’ parallelism of the Werner Plan, economic
policy coordination was to supplement provisions for joint interventions
and short-term credit. Britain, Ireland, Norway, and Sweden participated
as non-EEC members.
At the behest of the Bundesbank, Germany introduced capital controls to
prevent external inflationary pressure from the new regime. Theoretical-
ly, such measures could have solved the German trilemma, cleverly per-
mitting exchange rate stability and anti-inflationary policies without in-
ducing regional monetary hegemony. However, during 1972 the Bundes-
bank demand for an intensification of this approach dissipated as Finance
Minister Helmut Schmidt made the necessary government approval de-
pendent on his own ministry’s participation in Bundesbank decisions. In
other words, capital controls could become a Trojan horse for political
influence over Bundesbank policies.
69
The snake fell victim to continued international economic turmoil and the
subsequent cacophony of national macroeconomic policies. In July 1972,
sterling and the punt were the first casualties. A vain attempt was made at
the Paris Summit to lend credibility to the snake by reaffirming the dual
EMU and SEM agenda and calling for a European Union by 1980. With
68  Goodman 186.
69  Jürgen von Hagen’s treatment of the Bundesbank’s deliberations in the 1970s in-
cludes discussion of the importance of exchange-rate considerations in the Bun-
desbank’s decision to continue the use of monetary targetting. The analysis re-
flects the Bundesbank’s early 1970s preference for capital controls to reconcile a
fixed exchange rate with domestic price stability. “Geldpolitik auf neuen Wegen
(1971-1978),” Fünfzig Jahre Deutsche Mark: Notenbank und Währung in
Deutschland seit 1948, ed. Deutsche Bundesbank (C.H. Beck Verlag, 1998) 448-
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the dollar falling under more speculation in January 1973, the Bundes-
bank pointed to the inefficacy of capital controls and argued in favor of
closing the foreign exchange market, a measure that would not compro-
mise its political independence. Schmidt, however, feared that any Ger-
man unilateral approach would conflict with EMU and opted to buy time
for a joint European solution by temporarily strengthening capital con-
trols.
70 After jointly closing foreign exchange markets, snake constituents
agreed to float against the dollar in March 1973.
The snake did not survive without its shelter for very long, however. The
lira and the franc departed in January 1974 and March 1976, respectively.
The mark anchored the remaining currencies (Benelux countries, Den-
mark, Sweden, and Norway) in a progressively shrinking zone of stabili-
ty. Sweden withdrew in August 1977 and Norway in December 1978.
Tsoukalis concludes,
”For Germany, the snake contributed towards a certain undervaluation of
the DM . . . . For the smaller countries, the corresponding appreciation of
their currencies against the DM seemed to be offset by the greater stability
of the exchange rate and the increased credibility of their economic poli-
cies.”
71
By diverting pressure for appreciation from the mark, fixed exchange ra-
tes helped maintain German export competitiveness in Europe. However,
given the political and economic limitations of capital controls, German
achievement of price stability exerted pressure for adjustment on partners
whose lack of anti-inflationary credibility required interest rate policies
more rigorous than its own. Weaker currency countries, most importantly
France, had to endure subjugation to German monetary hegemony in the
form of exchange rate overvaluation and high interest rates. Ultimately
they opted out.
70  Von Hagen 449.
71  Tsoukalis 182.European Monetary Union: The German Political-Economic Trilemma
27
From the European Monetary System to EMU
As the main advocate of the EMS, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt sought to
protect German export competitiveness from the dollar volatility of the
latter 1970s. In an effort to entice renewed French, British, and Italian
participation, the new regime was geared toward overcoming the asym-
metric burden of macroeconomic policy adjustment faced by the weaker
currency countries.
72 Any remedy for the problem of German hegemony
still entailed, however, a certain risk of inflation. Anticipating the resi-
stance of the Bundesbank, Schmidt and French President Giscard
d’Estaing presented their decision to create the EMS as a fait accompli.
73
An agreement among national central banks, the EMS retroactively took
effect on January 1, 1979 and instituted among constituents the margins of
fluctuation of the defunct Smithsonian accord. Unlike the Werner Plan,
the EMS relegated specific considerations for monetary union to the futu-
re.
Once again, fixed exchange rates had broad appeal in the EC. In addition
to sheltering the common market from dollar fluctuations, the EMS would
keep the CAP intact and foster a united European identity independent of
the United States.
74 On one hand, Germany’s partners had begun to con-
vert to the Gospel of disinflation and intentionally acquiesced to German
hegemony to gain anti-inflationary credibility.
75 On the other hand, three
measures existed to enervate the asymmetry. First, the EMS was con-
structed as an adjustable peg, i.e. realignments could ease pressure on
exchange rates and domestic policies. Second, intervention and credit me-
chanisms were developed to ease the burden of deficit countries. The
central banks of surplus countries bore an obligation to intervene when
currencies reached the bilateral margins of fluctuation and preferably even
72  Von Hagen 467.
73  Guerot notes that Schmidt even threatened to change the Bundesbank’s mandate if
the institution acted against the EMS, 235.
74  Tsoukalis 183f.
75  Goodman 189-196; Tsoukalis 184.Eric Richard Staal
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beforehand. Such interventions and settlements of account were to be
conducted in ECU, in order to drive EMS inflation toward an average of
currencies in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) rather than toward
the lowest rate. To assist deficit countries, members pooled foreign reser-
ves in the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) and also ex-
panded the credit facilities of the early 1970s.
76 Finally, the EMS was
born under the zodiac of capital controls, a measure to which, inter alia,
France auspiciously resorted. During the operation of the EMS each of
these measures was steadily eroded, while renewed international monetary
turmoil exacerbated the prevailing asymmetric tensions. The preservation
of exchange rate stability and progress toward the SEM essentially left
one option, EMU. Amid growing concerns about the overall competitive-
ness of the EC in an age of globalization, a single currency would be the
crowning achievement of a consolidated SEM.
In the first two years of the EMS, capital controls and unilateral devalua-
tions prevented vast differences in macroeconomic policies from subver-
ting the system. However, after the lira devaluation of February 1981, the
Monetary Committee began to call for domestic policy changes to accom-
pany realignments.
77 The Committee’s ability to coerce reforms seems to
have rested on its willingness to prevent devaluations from fully compen-
sating for price and wage differentials, thereby producing continued disin-
flationary pressure. As the mark never devalued, this meant a “gain in
competitiveness for Benelux countries and Germany” against Italy and
Spain, for example.
78 Other than narrowing the bands of fluctuation for
the lira to the normal 2.25 percent, there were no realignments from 1987
76  Tsoukalis details these mechanisms (184-186).
77  There were many exceptions to this rule, for example, the French devaluation of
October 1981. As an indirect beneficiary of other realignments, Italy also circum-
vented the demand for new policies. See Goodman 199.
78  Tsoukalis acknowledges the difficulty with measuring competitveness, but none-
theless concludes that the “lira stands out in terms of its cumulative overvalua-
tion,” 193-195. Goodman supports this point about the advantageous effect for
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to 1992. Thus, as currency realignments became less frequent and subject
to more control, the asymmetric burden of adjustment became more seve-
re.
Meanwhile the intervention and credit mechanisms did not operate to eli-
minate either the need for realignments or the asymmetry that prevailed.
Despite the agreement that central banks would have a ‘presumption’ to
intervene when currency rates exhausted an agreed upon intramarginal
divergence indicator, the Bundesbank refrained from shoring up weaker
currencies for fear of stoking domestic inflation. Until 1987, the Bundes-
bank also headed off speculative pressure and circumvented the obligation
to provide credit to weak currency countries by convincing other mem-
bers to preemptively realign. For these reasons external inflationary pres-
sure never materialized to the degree the Bundesbank might have feared
at the outset of the EMS.
79 Instead, the burden of adjustment continued to
fall on weak currency countries and a division of labor emerged in which
the Bundesbank intervened against non-ERM currencies, particularly the
dollar, while other EMS members intervened on intra-ERM exchange
markets.
80
The period of stability and downward convergence of inflation after 1983
temporarily kept the lid on asymmetric pressures. However, after the Pla-
za Agreement of 1985 the weakening dollar eroded modest European ex-
port growth and set in motion a new appreciation of the mark vis-à-vis
other European currencies.
81 Adding to the tension, belated capital libera-
lization after 1987--part of the SEM agenda--abolished the last line of we-
ak country defense against German hegemony. The move to full capital
liberalization had languished since the early 1970s and was revitalized in
the SEA. The SEA focused on establishment of the Common Market and
drew the consequences for monetary integration by calling for an IGC to
79  Goodman 194-201.
80  Tsoukalis 198-200.
81  Tsoukalis 202.Eric Richard Staal
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negotiate institutional reforms of the EMS. Absent capital restrictions,
divergent monetary policies would more directly lead to asymmetric pres-
sures. As long as the Bundesbank neglected to intervene on foreign ex-
change markets and to reduce interest rates to accommodate the EMS
partners, German monetary policy would exert hegemonic pressures on
other countries in the system. Only a common monetary policy could sa-
tisfy the conditions of fixed exchange rates and full capital mobility, and
only a common currency guaranteed common monetary policy. In sum,
vitiation of the realignment mechanism, the Bundesbank’s circumvention
of intervention and credit obligations, and the dismantling of capital con-
trols all exacerbated asymmetric tension.
There were essentially three options for the EMS: abandonment, refor-
mation, or transformation. Having paid a heavy price to achieve currency
and exchange rate stability, there was little motivation to jettison the sy-
stem altogether. Exiting the regime meant not only the loss of access to
credit facilities but defection from European solidarity and further inte-
gration. It also carried untenable domestic implications:
”policy-makers generally consider a devaluation to be politically de-
trimental—because their constituents often interpret it as a sign of
failed policy. Since weak-currency countries may not be able to re-
sist pressure from Germany for a change in parities, their leaders
gain a new incentive to adopt restrictive monetary measures.”
82
Reform was not only more attractive but vital.
Supported by Italy, Belgium, Spain and the Commission, France led the
charge for EMS reforms.
83 Before the Strasbourg summit, Bitterlich lin-
ked the French demand for an IGC on EMU in 1990 to SEA provisions
82  Goodman, 200. Quote on page 198.
83  Schönfelder and Thiel 25-28. Tsoukalis 207. France and the Commission condi-
tioned support for capital liberalization on the EMS reforms undertaken at Basle
and Nyborg. Eckart Gaddum, Die deutsche Europapolitik in den 80er Jahren: In-
teressen, Konflikte und Entscheidungen der Regierung Kohl (Paderborn:
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on capital controls: “F[rance] has already offered its contribution, and
namely through the liberalisation of capital flows and through acknowled-
gement/acceptance of the leading role of the DM and the German orien-
tation (price stability, ‘independence,’ subsidiarity, etc.).”
84 France was
prepared to stay in the EMS but wanted light at the end of the tunnel for
the burden it had borne to arrest domestic inflation. The agreement re-
ached in the cities of Basle and Nyborg in 1987 expanded EMS credit fa-
cilities. However, the Bundesbank sought to offset the risks to price sta-
bility by institutionalizing the practice of preventing realignments from
compensating for inflation differentials and pledging non-intervention on
behalf of overvalued currencies. The Bundesbank’s countermeasures neu-
tralized hopes that reforms could sufficiently remedy the asymmetry. In a
speech in January 1988, one month before his memorandum advocating
EMU, Genscher acknowledged that “without new institutional precauti-
ons” the scope for reform of the EMS was small.
85 It was futile to expect
the Bundesbank to subordinate its 1957 mandate to guarantee domestic
price stability to the objective of growth elsewhere in Europe. This left
one option—deepening the system.
Germany faced the same trilemma. A collapse of the EMS would cer-
tainly lead to another appreciation of the mark. The EMS kept the curren-
cy competitive without causing domestic inflation, an enviable position
that satisfied the first two conditions of the trilemma but gave rise to the
third: a de facto German hegemony that imposed the burden of adjustment
on partners. Unmitigated German monetary hegemony became a foreign
policy liability
86 and undermined the very stability from which it resulted.
The French commitment to the franc fort policy—a major reason for
84  Vorlage des Vortragenden Legationsrats I Bitterlich an Bundeskanzler Kohl,
Bonn, 2 - 3 December 1989, Dokumente 597.
85  Schönfelder and Thiel 29.
86  Gaddum. He also argues that, in contrast to Schmidt, Kohl accepted Germany’s
large contributions to the EC budget and refrained from demanding CAP reforms
in order to offset the costs to Germany’s partners of participating in the EMS, 66 -
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which the system did not suffer the fate of its predecessors—grew more
questionable as reforms failed to deliver relief.
87 Guerot writes that Ger-
many was aware that “for political reasons a de facto existing monetary
policy dominance over France and other European countries was not to be
sustained for long.”
88 Germany needed both to sustain the system and sa-
tisfy the other members. Reforms had not relieved the asymmetry, owing
to the Bundesbank’s aversion to inflation. EMU, however, had the poten-
tial to resolve the German trilemma by eliminating the pressure for appre-
ciation and the asymmetry. Nonetheless, there had to be institutional gua-
rantees against inflation—above all sufficient economic convergence and
central bank independence. These were two of the most contentious points
during the Maastricht IGC on EMU.
Ironically, whereas EMU uniquely held the promise to resolve Germany’s
political-economic trilemma, the pursuit of it in the 1990s seemed to jeo-
pardize its achievement and harm Germany’s European image. After
Maastricht determined the details of the second two stages of EMU, the
enormous public spending consequences of unification reactivated the
German political-economic trilemma. Bundesbank interest rate rises to
stymie inflation unleashed extraordinary asymmetric pressure, exacerba-
ting record European unemployment. Under the circumstances, the ulti-
mate ability of national governments to opt out of the ‘irreversible’
process that had begun at Madrid placed the credibility of the entire EMU
project at stake. When the electorate rejected the Maastricht Treaty in
Denmark and scarcely gave its approval in France, skeptics saw themsel-
ves vindicated. In September 1992, Britain and Italy were forced from the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) after massive and costly interventions.
Speculation against the franc the following summer led to a widening of
the ERM margins of fluctuation to thirty percent, effectively eliminating
87  See Dana Allin, “Germany Looks at France” France –Germany, 1983 – 1993:
The Struggle to Cooperate, ed. Patrick McCarthy (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1993) 43.
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asymmetric pressure from Germany’s high interest rates but leaving the
potential for currency fluctuations severe enough to damage the German
export position. EMU seemed doomed by sheer unfeasibility. Inaddition
to the political unfashionability, the economics profession assialed EMU
on the basis of Optmial Currencya Area analysis, arguing that the denial
of independent exchzange rates and mnetary policies would lessen the suf-
ferability of widespread European joblessness. However, the realities of
the EMS and existence of strong downward wage rigidietes already con-
strained the effectiveness of these mechanisms of macroeconomic
adjstment.
89 The elimination of national interest and exchange rate poli-
cies was therefore no radical departure from the status quo. Indeed, given
that the EXB would set interest rates based on conditions throughout Eu-
rope and not merely in Germany, EMU could even be more conduvcive
to employment than was the EMS.
90
There is widespread belief that the Kohl government´s position on EMU
throughout the 1990´s derives from an unification imperative, i.e. the
need to sacrifice the mark as a diplomatic expedient to attain unification
and European political union. EMU, it is argued , offers Germany little
economic benefit. Whatever the unpopularity, European leaders stayed
the EMU course during the inauspicious 1990s and reached its achieve-
ment in 1999. More than either a fallacious economic policy or a geo-
political reaction to the disturbing foreign policy implications of sudden
German unification, there is a cogent logic which explains the Kohl go-
vernment´s unyielding commitment to a most unpopular enterprise. Ger-
many´s position was conceivably not opposition but support, not cunning
89  The seminal theoretical expostition of OCAs is in, Robert Mundell, „A Theory of
Optimum Currency Areas“, American Economic Review 51 (September 1961):
657-665. For indicators that the optimality of the euro zone compares to that of
the United States see, „An Awfully Big Adventure“, Economist: A Survey of
EMU 11 April 1998.
90  For specific expamples see, Agnes Benassy-Quere and Benoit Mojon, „EMU and
Transatlantic Exchange-Rate Stability“ The EMU´s Exchange Rate Policy (Zen-
trum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, Bonn:Policy Paper B98-04), 25.Eric Richard Staal
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reluctance to concede hegemony but the imperatives of guaranteeing the
success of EMU. The Kohl government had sound economic reason to
pursue EMU, which entailed both a positive diplomatic externatilty for
German unification in 1990 and, after the Treaty was negotiated, an un-
warranted negative impact on Germany´s European image.ISSN 1435-3288 ISBN 3-933307-45-7
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